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COMMENTS
FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST STATE
COURT CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS:
FROM YOUNG TO YOUNGER
One of the most complicated and sensitive areas of the
federal-state relationship involves the power of federal courts to
grant injunctive relief against state criminal proceedings. Therefore, the purpose of this Comment is to discuss federal equitable
relief through injunctions and declaratory judgments and how
these remedies are affected by the principles of federalism and
abstention, especially as applied in several recent Supreme
Court decisions.'
The Equitable Remedy of Injunction
Injunction is an equitable remedy which, historically, has
been available only where there was no adequate legal remedy.
This principle of equity became statutory law in the United
States through the Judiciary Act of 1789, wherein it was stated
"[t]hat suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the
courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate
and complete remedy may be had at law."2 It was recognized
early that the mere existence of a possible remedy at law is
not sufficient to deny relief in equity, but rather that the legal
remedy must be "as practical and efficient to the ends of justice"
as its equitable counterpart.8
Because an appeal to equity involves a bypassing of the
courts of law, access to the equity courts has been limited by
1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66

(1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Bryne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216
(1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77
(1971).

2. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 82. The comment to the Act
states that "[t]he equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States ...
is the same in nature and extent as the equity jurisdiction of England from
which it is derived." (The act was declared obsolete in the new Title 28 by
the Act of June 25, 1948). See a7so Grand Chute v. Winegar, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 373 (1872); Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 616 (1871);
Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425 (1868); Watson v. Sutherland, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 74 (1866).
3. "If the remedy at law is sufficient, equity cannot give relief, 'but it is

not enough that there Is a remedy at law; it must be plain and adequate, or
In

other words, as practical and efficient to the ends of justice, and Its

prompt administration, as the remedy in equity.'" Watson v. Sutherland, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 74, 78 (1866) (footnote omitted).
[6011
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the test of irreparable injury (i.e., the present or future possibility of irreparable injury to the party seeking relief.) In two
mid-nineteenth century cases the Supreme Court held that "[iif
the... injury [be] irreparable.., the injured party may claim
the extraordinary protection of a court of chancery . . .,,4 and
"[a] Court of Equity will interfere when the injury by the
wrongful act of the adverse party will be irreparable . ..

."I

This test has recently been affirmed by the Supreme Court, when
it stated that "[t]he basis of injunctive relief in the federal
courts has always been irreparable harm . .

.

The limits of the test of irreparable injury, though defined
many times, have not always been agreed upon by the courts.
The term has been said to mean an injury of "constant and
frequent recurrence"; 7 an injury that "cannot be adequately compensated in damages";8 and one "which is certain and great."9
One of the most famous findings of irreparable injury occurred
in Ex parte Young.10 There the railroad commission of Minnesota had enacted a schedule of maximum allowable rates for
railroads operating in that state. The railroads believed these
rates were so low as to be confiscatory, but the penal provisions
of the statute were so severe that the officials were unable to
test the validity of the order in the courts." These penalties
4. "[If the obstruction be unlawful and the injury irreparable . . . the
injured party may claim the extraordinary protection of a court of chancery." Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.)
518, 564 (1851).
5. Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woollen Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black)
545, 551 (1862).
6. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506 (1959).
7. "When irreparable injury is spoken of it is not meant that the injury
is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond the possibility of compensation
in damages, but it must be of such constant and frequent recurrence that
no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in the court of law. [Citations omitted.]" Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279, 305 (1905).
8. "The general rule in equity is that an injury is deemed irreparable
when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature
of the injury itself, or the nature of the right or property injured, or when
there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of the
damages." Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Norton, 21 F. Supp. 707, 709 (E.D. Pa.

1937).

9. Quon v. Stans, 309 F. Supp. 604, 607 (N.D. Cal, 1970) (footnotes omitted).
10. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
11. The statute provided that each and every violation by any railroad
officer, agent, or representative could carry a fine of up to five thousand
dollars and five years imprisonment. The statute was so worded that every
time these rates were exceeded in the sale of passenger tickets, a separate
crime would be charged. Further, a similar statute was passed concerning
freight rates providing a maximum penalty of ninety days imprisonment for
each violation.

1972]

COMMENTS

made it clear that the legislature was trying to prevent any
inquiry into the validity of the statutes. The Supreme Court
held that the statutes were unconstitutional because they denied the railroads the equal protection of the laws and ruled
that the circuit court could enjoin the state officials from enforcing the rate schedules. The court found irreparable injury
in the threatened multiplicity of suits for each violation and the
fact that any violation and subsequent trial "would ... furnish

no reasonable or adequate opportunity for the presentation of
that the rates were too
a defense founded upon the assertion
12
low and therefore the act invalid.'

Historically, courts of equity would not enjoin state criminal
proceedings. The court in Young recognized this fact, but cited
several exceptions. 1" Intervention to restrain the operation of
criminal statutes has always been rare, even where there has
existed the possibility of unconstitutionality. The reason for
such hesitation to intervene is twofold: One, the unconstitutionality can be interposed as a defense to the prosecution; and two,
it was early thought that any injunction against criminal proceedings was beyond the power of the court of equity to enforce
and therefore, the injunction could be disregarded with impugnity. 14 In the early Supreme Court case of In re Sawyer,15
the Court held that courts of equity should protect property
rights only and that criminal prosecutions were outside the
domain of such courts. Hence, plaintiff's attempt to restrain his
removal from public office for malfeasance was fruitless.
Around the turn of the century, the Court began to shift
12. 209 U.S. 123, 165 (1908).
13. Id. at 161-62: "When such indictment or proceeding is brought to enforce an alleged unconstitutional statute, which is the subject matter of
Inquiry in a suit already pending in a Federal court, the latter court having

first obtained jurisdiction over the subject matter, has the right, in both
civil and criminal cases, to hold and maintain such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, until its duty is fully performed. [Citations
omitted.] Where one commences a criminal proceeding who is already a
party to a suit then pending in a court of equity, if the criminal proceedings
are brought to enforce the same right that is in issue before that court,
the latter may enjoin such criminal proceedings."
14. Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S.W.
565 (1908); State ex rel. Kenamore v. Wood, 155 Mo. 425, 56 S.W. 474 (1900).
15. "The ... jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by express
statute is limited to the protection of rights of property. . . . [T]o sustain
a bill in equity to restrain or relieve against proceedings for the punishments
of offenses . . . is to invade the domain of the courts of common law ..
In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888).
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in its ideas and criminal laws became the proper target of injunctions to protect property rights. 5 The Court began to speak
of an exception to the prohibition against enjoining pending
state criminal prosecutions, that exception existing when the
statutory basis of the prosecution was invalid. 17 Significantly,
the unconstitutionality of the statute or ordinance was not
enough, by itself, to justify intervention. As stated in Terrace v.
Thompson, 8 there still had to be a lack of complete relief at
law and the strong probability of irreparable injury.
In 1926, the Supreme Court further restricted the possibility
of securing injunctive relief in state criminal prosecutions in
the case of Fenner v. Boykin.'9 There the Court affirmed a
lower court decision denying relief against the state of Georgia,
which had made illegal certain dealings in the future delivery
of commodities. In affirming, the Court held that injunctive
relief would not be granted except "where the danger of irreparable injury is both great and immediate."0 This new dimension of great and immediate injury has subsequently been repeated in Supreme Court decisions. 2'
Another important statement on the availability of injunctive relief in criminal cases was made in 1940 in Beal v. Missouri
16. "It is well settled that where property rights will be destroyed unlawful interference by criminal proceedings under a void law or ordinance
may be reached and controlled by a decree of a court of equity." Dobbins
v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 241 (1904).
17. The general rule is that a court of equity is without jurisdiction to
restrain criminal proceedings to try the same right that is in issue before
it; but an exception to this rule exists when the prevention of such prosecutions under alleged unconstitutional enactments is essential to the safeguarding of rights of property, and when the circumstances are exceptional
and the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate." Cline V.
Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1927). See Hygrade Provision Co. v.
Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 500 (1925), wherein it was held that "[a] court of
equity will interfere to prevent criminal prosecutions under an unconstitutional statute when that Is necessary to effectually protect property rights."
See also Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924).
18. 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923): "The unconstitutionality of a state law is
not of itself ground for equitable relief in the courts of the United States.
That a suit in equity does not lie where there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law is so well understood as not to require the citation of
authorities. But the legal remedy must be as complete, practical and efficient
as that which equity could afford. [Citations omitted.] Equity jurisdiction
will be exercised to enjoin the threatened enforcement of a state law which
contravenes the Federal Constitution wherever it is essential in order effectually to protect property rights . . . otherwise irremediable.
19. 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
20. Id. at 243. (Emphasis added.)
21. Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935); Cline v.
Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
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Pacific Railroad Co.22 There a railroad company brought suit to
restrain state officers from prosecuting under a state "full train
crew" law where the company alleged that there was a threat
of multiple prosecutions. The court held that even though there
may be a possibility that a statute is illegal, no one is immune
from a prosecution brought in good faith. However, prosecution
undertaken in bad faith can be suitable justification for federal
injunctive relief, provided the other necessary requisites are
23
present.
There is one last aspect of equitable relief which needs
mention. For years the courts of equity seemed intent upon
granting relief only where injury to property was involved.2 4
The rule that equity protects only property rights has been
traced to dicta by Lord Chancellor Eldon in Gee v. Pritchard,25 an early nineteenth century case. Although many courts
repeatedly paid lip service to this unfortunate utterance, the
Supreme Court refused to follow it in Hague v. C. I. O.,26 a strong
decision concerning the protection of civil rights. In the nearest
thing to a landmark case on the state level, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in Kenyon v. Chicopee, said "[w]e
22. 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
23. "No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a
prosecution even though alleged to be authorized and hence unlawful is
not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers
only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid." Id. at
49. See also Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
24. Bonifaci v. Thompson, 252 F. 878 (W.D. Wash. 1917); Angelus v.
Sullivan, 246 F. 54 (2d Cir. 1917); Bank v. Bank, 180 Md. 254, 23 A.2d 700
(1942); Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542 (1896); Hutchinson v.
Goshorn, 256 Pa. 69, 100 A. 586 (1917).
25. "I do not say that I am to interfere because the letters are written
in confidence, or because the publication of them may wound the feelings of
the Plaintiff; but if mischievous effects of that kind can be apprehended in
cases in which this Court has been accustomed, on the ground of property,
to forbid publication, it would not become me to abandon the jurisdiction
which my precedessors have exercised, and refused to forbid it." The view
expressed here was that the jurisdiction of the court was based solely on
property rights. 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 678 (Ch. 1918).
26. 307 U.S. 496 (1938). This was a suit to enjoin municipal officers from
enforcing ordinances forbidding the distribution of printed matter and the
holding of public meetings without permits. The court held the ordinance
void and enjoined officials to prevent improper interference with the rights
of plaintiffs and their agents to properly communicate their views. The
court said "Itihe conclusion seems inescapable that the right . . . to maintain suit in equity in the federal courts to protect the suitor against a deprivation of rights . . . secured by the Constitution, has been preserved, and
that whenever the right . . . is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its
existence upon the infringement of property rights, there is jurisdiction in
the district court. . . ." Id. at 531.
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believe the true rule to be that equity will protect personal rights
by injunction upon the same condition upon which it will protect
property rights by injunction."
Thus, by the 1960's, the rules concerning federal injunctive
relief against state criminal prosecutions had developed to the
following point: No injunctive relief could be obtained unless
there was the possibility of irreparable injury; the threat of
irreparable injury had to be both great and immediate; the
statute upon which the criminal prosecution was based had to
be invalid; and the courts of equity would only enjoin threatened,
not pending, state proceedings.
Federalism and Pending Proceedings
The Anti-Injunction Act: Judicial Exceptions
The traditional grounds for equitable relief presents but one
aspect of the barrier faced by the petitioner who seeks federal
injunctive relief. Just as equitable criteria in the United States
courts took shape over the years, the doctrines of comity and
abstention and the Anti-Injunction Act 28 likewise developed and

expanded. Comity describes that respect shown state courts by
their federal counterparts. With the dual sovereignty concept
present in this country, 29 some friction and conflict obviously
develops between the two court systems. Federalism demands,
however, that needless conflict be avoided; that the courts extend
27. "In reading the decisions holding or stating that equity will protect
only property rights, one is struck by the absence of any convincing reasons
for such a sweeping generalization. We are by no means satisfied that
property rights and personal rights are always as distinct and readily
separable as much of the public discussion in recent years would have them.
But In so far as the distinction exists we cannot believe that personal rights
recognized by law are In general less important to the individual or less
vital to society or less worthy of protection by the peculiar remedies equity
can afford than are property rights .... We believe the true rule to be
that equity will protect personal rights by injunction upon the same conditions upon which it will protect property rights by injunction. 320 Mass.
528, 533, 70 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1946).
28. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (1948) provides: "A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
29. "Such being the distinct and independent character of the two governments, within their respective spheres of action, it follows that neither
can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the other, except
so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National government to preserve its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of authority."
Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 407 (1871).
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to each other all possible consideration to effectuate smoother
functioning of both systems; and that any interference between
the two come only when absolutely necessary. From this respect stems also the doctrine of abstention, to be discussed at
a point later in this paper.
It has been suggested by at least one author that comity
concepts, which restrict federal injunctive relief, apply to threatened state prosecutions, while the Anti-Injunction Act applies
only to pending state proceedings. 8° This statute, enacted nearly
one hundred and eighty years ago, has been a constant source
of controversy. Originally passed as an early addition to the
Judiciary Act of 1789, the Act clearly forbade federal court injunctions against pending state proceedings. 81 Unfortunately,
the lack of records has made an accurate determination of the
legislative purpose impossible, an insufficiency which has led
to much subsequent litigation. One noted author has suggested
that Attorney General Randolph's report recommending that
"no injunction in equity shall be granted by a district court to
82
a judgment at law of a state court" prompted Congress to act.
However, such explanation has not received widespread acceptance and, in fact, was rejected by the Supreme Court.8
According to a later Supreme Court case, the first opportunity to construe the Anti-Injunction Act came in an 1807 suit
concerning the non-payment of promissory notes. In Diggs &
Keith v. Wolcott, 4 the attempt to obtain a federal injunction
against the state court action on the notes was unsuccessful,
30. Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings:
The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAs L. Rsv. 535 (1970).

31. "[N]or shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in
any court of a state .... " Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334.
32. Randolph further stated: "This clause will debar the district court
from interfering with judgments at law in the State courts; for if the plaintiff and defendant rely upon the State courts as far as the judgment, they
ought to continue there as they have begun. It is enough to split the same
suit into one at law, and the other in equity, without adding a further separation, by throwing the common law side of the question into the State
courts, and the equity side into the federal courts." American State Papers,
1 Misc. No. 34, n.8. See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43
HARV. L. REv. 345, 347 (1930).
33. "This [proposition] seems doubtful, in view of the narrow purpose

of Randolph's proposal, namely, that federal courts of equity should not
interfere with the enforcement of judgments at law rendered in state courts."
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 131 (1941).

34. 8 U.S. (4 Cran.) 178, 179 (1807). No injunction was granted because
"a circuit court of the United States had not jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in a state court."
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the Court holding that it had no such power of relief. It is
questionable whether the Court actually considered the Act, because no mention of it is found in the opinion. However, forty
years later the Court noted in another case that its earlier decision in Diggs was indeed based on the Anti-Injunction Statute.35
It was not until 1871 that the Supreme Court cited the Act
in another opinion. In Watson v. Jones,86 the court was asked
to rule on a dispute between two factions in a church congregation, both claiming the right to possess the church property. The
opinion contains a brief notation of the Act's express prohibition
of injunctive relief against pending state court proceedings. The
barrier presented by the Act's prohibition has not, however,
proved insurmountable. Through the years, exceptions, both
legislative and judicial, have attached themselves to the Act. By
specific amendment to the Act, Congress gave the federal courts
the power to enjoin any state court actions once bankruptcy
proceedings were brought in the federal courts.87 Another specific congressional exception was the Insurance Interpleader
Act of 1926.-8 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this act
allows the Court to enjoin multiple state actions brought against
a single insurer when the claimants' actions arise out of the
same claim, and further provides that all such claims will be
tried together. 89 Other legislative exceptions include the Re35. "The Act of Congress of the 2d of March 1793, ch. 66, § 5, declares
that a writ of injunction shall not be granted 'to stay proceedings in any
court of a state.' In the case of Diggs v. Wolcott . . . the decree of the
Circuit Court had enjoined the defendant from proceeding in a suit pending

in a State court, and this court reversed the decree, because it had no jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in a State court." Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 612, 625 (1849).
36. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 719 (1871): "And the [Anti-Injunction Statute]
as construed in the cases of Diggs v. Wolcott . . . and Peck v. Jenness ...
are equally conclusive against any injunction from the Circuit Court . .. ."
37. In the Judicial Code of 1911, the statute reads: "The writ of injunc-

tion shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state, except in cases where such injunction may be
authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."

38. "Notwithstanding any provision of the Judicial Code to the contrary,
said [federal district] court shall have power to issue its process for all

such claimants and to issue an order of injunction against each of them,
enjoining them from instituting or prosecuting any suit or proceeding in
any State court . . . ." Act of Jan. 10, 1936, ch. 13, § 1, 49, Stat. 1096.
39. In Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U.S. 414 (1937), the Supreme Court held that defendant surety company could obtain an injunction against various claimants in state court, and that such injunction
could be issued by a federal district court in order to allow the claims to be
Interpleaded before federal court in order to decide them all at one time.
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moval Acts, 40 the Frazier-Lemke Act,41 and the Act of 1851

limiting shipowners' liability.42

The most controversial aspect of the Anti-Injunction Act has
been in the area of judicial exceptions. In an early case, the
Supreme Court recognized the federal court's right to protect its
judgment by enjoining those state court proceedings which arose
48
after a federal court had rendered its judgment.
Because judgments fradulently obtained from state courts
were offensive to the federal court's sense of fairness, another
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act was created. In Simon v.
Southern Railway Co.,44 an action was brought to enjoin the
plaintiff from enforcing a judgment alleged to be fraudulently
obtained in state court. The Supreme Court held that such
state judgment was a nullity and a proper object of federal injunction.45 Another example of judicial exception is found in
Kline v. Burke Construction Co.48 In that case the Court found
the Anti-Injunction Act to be no bar to a federal injunction
issued to protect its own properly acquired jurisdiction in an
in rem action. 47 One final exception combines both a legislative
and a judicial exception. In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,4 the Court
40. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 79.
41. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 75(o), 47 Stat. 1473.
42. Act of March 3, 1951, ch. 43, § 4, 9 Stat. 635, 636.
43. "[It
has been held that, in aid of its jurisdiction properly acquired,
and in order to render its judgments and decrees effectual, a Federal court
may restrain proceedings in a state court which would have the effect of
defeating or impairing such jurisdiction." Hull v. Burr, 234 U.S. 712, 723
(1914). See also Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921);
French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 238 (1874).
44. 236 U.S. 115 (1915).
45. Id. at 128: "[Wlhile . . . [the Anti-Injunction Act] prohibits United
States courts from 'staying proceedings in a state court,' it does not prevent
them from depriving a party of the fruits of a fraudulent judgment nor
prevent the Federal courts from enjoining a party from using that which
he calls a judgment but which is, in fact and in law, a mere nullity." Actually, the case was not a clear-cut exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The
Court raised the question whether a judgment, once rendered, was still a
proceeding within the meaning of the statute. Although the Court posed this
question, it was never actually answered.
46. 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
47. "[Tlhis section [Anti-Injunction Act] is to be construed in connection
with § 262 [all writs statute] which authorized the United States Courts 'to
issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law' . . . . It is settled that where a federal court
has first acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a cause, it may enjoin
the parties from proceeding In a state court of concurrent jurisdiction where
the effect of the action would be to defeat or impair the jurisdiction of the
federal court." Id. at 229.
48. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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held that injunctive relief was available to prevent the relitigation in state courts of a federal discharge in bankruptcy, thereby
combining the legislative bankruptcy exception and the judicial
exception allowing injunctive relief to protect a federal judgment.
These exceptions had no small effect on the Anti-Injunction
Act. What had once been an express prohibition became a less
than absolute pronouncement as new interpretations were added
by the courts. In fact, the authors of an article appearing in the
1930's in a leading law review contended that the Act was, and
had been for sometime, dead.49
In the midst of this confusion, a simple insurance claim
brought some sorely needed, albeit short-lived, clarity from the
Supreme Court. In the case of Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 0 the plaintiff claimed monthly benefits under an
insurance policy. Originally brought in a Missouri court, the
suit was removed to federal court on the grounds of diversity.
The district court found for the insurer after trial on the merits
and dismissed the suit, but later an alleged assignee of the plaintiff brought another suit based on the plaintiff's disability. Defendant sought federal injunctive relief against this new action,
claiming it was a relitigation of matters decided in the earlier
suit. An injunction was granted, notwithstanding the AntiInjunction Act. 51 In an extremely thorough opinion, Justice
Frankfurter traced the history of the Anti-Injunction Act and
its exceptions, both legislative and judicial, and reached the
conclusion that only one judicial exception should be recognized.
That exception would allow a federal court to enjoin a state
court proceeding if the federal court had first acquired jurisdiction over the res in an in rem action. 52 In voiding the injunction,
49. "We venture, however, the wild surmise that, if Congress should repeal the statute and so furnish us a laboratory for comparative study of the
practice [of federal injunctions against state court proceedings] with and
without that legislation, we would find that, except for the prohibition, in

some cases, of injunction before judgment, the statute has long since been
dead." Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State
Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1169 (1932).
60. 314 U.S, 118 (1941).

51. 102 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1939).
52. "We find, therefore, that apart from Congressional authorization,
only one 'exception' has been imbedded in

§ 265 by judicial construction,

to wit, the res cases. The fact that one exception has found its way
into § 265 is no justification for making another.

Furthermore, the res ex-

ception, having its roots in the same policy from which sprung § 265, has
had an uninterrupted and firmly established acceptance In the decisions.
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Justice Frankfurter clearly enunciated the majority's rejection
of the use of injunctions to prevent relitigation.58 In a strong
dissent, Justice Reed upheld the validity of federal injunctions
issued to "protect [federal court] decrees by prohibiting re-

litigation .

. .,,4

Such a strong majority opinion would seemingly have
marked the end of the judicial exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act, but this was not to be. In June 1948 Congress erased Toucey
by re-enacting and amending the Anti-Injunction Act.a5 The Act
was amended to allow a federal court to grant injunctions "where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments." 56 Part of the comment which follows the amended act states that "[t]he revised section restores the basic law
as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey
decision."5 7
Thus Toucey, rather than the exceptions, was "laid to rest."
Not only do the exceptions remain, but they have increased in
number. In Leiter Minerals,Inc. v. United States,68 the Supreme
The rule of the res cases was unequivocally on the books when Congress reenacted the original § 5 of the Act of 1793, first by the Revised Statutes of
1874 and later by the Judicial Code in 1911." Toucey v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139 (1941). The Court rejected the fraudulent judgment
exception found in Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115 (1914), by stating
that a judgment was a state proceeding and thus barred by the Act. The
Court further rejected the relitigation exception found in Supreme Tribe
of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), by saying It was erroneously based
on another case, Looney v. Eastern R. R. Co., 247 U.S. 214 (1918), which was
not even a relitigation case.
53. "Loose language and a sporadic, ill-considered decision cannot be held
to have imbedded in our law a doctrine which so patently violates the expressed prohibition of Congress . . . . Whatever justification there may be for

turning past error into law when reasonable expectations would thereby be
defeated, no such justification can be urged on behalf of a procedural doctrine in the distribution of judicial power between federal and state courts.
"It Is indulging in the merest fiction to suggest that . . . Congress in
effect enacted [the judicial exception concerning relitigation] through its
silence. There is no occasion here to regard the silence of Congress as more
commanding that its own plainly and unmistakably spoken words." Id. at
139-40.
54. Id. at 154.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
56. Id.
57. Id. There is some question as to whether all the exceptions prior to
Toucey have been reenacted, or only the relitigation exception. The Court
has never ruled that the "fraudulently obtained judgment" exception still
exists.
58. 352 U.S. 200, 226 (1956): "The frustration of superior federal interests
that would ensue from precluding the Federal Government from obtaining
a stay of state court proceedings except under the severe restrictions of 28

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Court held for the first time that when interests of the United
States are involved, a federal court can enjoin proceedings in
a state court.
The Anti-Injunction Act: Legislative Exceptions
The area of legislative exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act, unlike those made by the judiciary, is one of clear definition and relatively uniform case law, with one notable qualification-the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 59 This Act and its relationship to the Anti-Injunction Act has been a source of considerable
confusion in the federal courts. The controversy centers around
the words "suit in equity" found at the end of the Act." Does
it mean that federal injunctive relief is available to one who is
the object of pending state prosecution if such prosecution would
constitute a denial of rights "secured by the Constitution and
laws?"' If so, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 would then be a
legislative exception to the prohibition of the Anti-Injunction
Act.
The Supreme Court has failed to give a definitive ruling on
this issue and, therefore, the circuit courts are divided as to
whether the Civil Rights Act is an exception. The situation in
the circuit courts of appeal can be roughly categorized as follows: Those which hold the Act to be an exception; those which
hold it is not; and those which hold it to be an exception of
limited application. While the Seventh Circuit has held at least
twice that the Civil Rights Act creates no exception,62 the
strongest language supporting this contention has come from
the Fourth Circuit. In Baines v. City of Danville," a case inU.S.C. § 2283 would be so great that we cannot reasonably impute such a
purpose to Congress from the general language of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 alone. It is
always difficult to feel confident about construing an ambiguous statute when
the aids to construction are so meager, but the interpretation excluding the
United States from coverage of the statute seems to us preferable in the
context of healthy federal-state relations."
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress."
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963); Smith v. Village of
Lansing, 241 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1957).
63. 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
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volving a Virginia anti-picketing statute, the court held that
only explicit legislative exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act
would be recognized and that the Civil Rights Act did not meet
that requirement. The court stated that the Civil Rights Act
gives "no suggestion . . . that appropriate relief [under the

statute] shall include an injunction which another Act of Congress [the Anti-Injunction Act] forbids." 4 On the other hand,
as early as 1950, in Cooper v. Hutchinson, 5 the Third Circuit
held that section 1983 was a clear exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Reaffirming this position some twenty years later, the
court said:
"to be sure other circuits have taken a contrary position...
but the Supreme Court has not yet deemed it necessary to
resolve this conflict .... We therefore reiterate our statement . . . . 'We are satisfied that no opinion of the Supreme

Court casts serious doubt upon the validity of the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 adopted in Cooper v. Hutchinson/?....

"6
'"168

Finally, there is the category of cases wherein the Civil
Rights Act is an exception of limited dimension. In a recent
case, Sheridan v. Garrison,7 the Fifth Circuit held that section
1983 was an exception, but the court was very careful to limit
its holding. First, the court said that the exception only applies
to cases dealing with first amendment rights. Second, although
proceedings are technically begun by the filing of an indictment,
the exception will apply if no trial proceedings have actually
begun. Third, injunctive relief must be the only way to avoid
"grave and irreparable injury"8 with "no other equally effective
protection" available.6 9 The next year, the Sixth Circuit followed this formula almost exactly in Honey v. Goodman,70
64. The court further stated that '[if every grant of general equity
jurisdiction created an exception to the anti-injunction statute, the statute
would be meaningless." Id. at 689.
65. 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
66. National Land & Investment Co. v. Specter, 428 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir.
1970). See also Devita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1970).
67. 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1970).
68. Id. at 705.
69. Id. at 708. See also Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1971),
where, in the first case decided on point since the Younger v. Harris decision,
the court held that § 2283 was not a bar to relief based on § 1983.
70. 432 F.2d 333, 343 (6th Cir. 1970). The remaining circuits have not
ruled whether the Civil Rights Act is a legislative exception to the AntiInjunction Act.
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wherein it was decided that, in the same limited circumstances,
the Civil Rights Act was an exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act. In that case, the petitioners had been indicted for the common law offense of embracery for distributing a letter condemning the actions of the local prosecutor. The court found
that the indictments were brought in a bad faith effort to curb
the defendant's right of free speech.
The federal district courts reflect the disagreement found
in the circuits, and in fact there are disagreements between
various district courts within the same circuit. 71 The language
in the cases ranges from "the court holds that [the Civil Rights
Act] is an 'express authorization' within the meaning of [the
Anti-Injunction Act] 11 2 to "[t]he weight of authority and the
better reasoned approach require a decision that [the AntiInjunction Act] prohibits the enjoining of these state proceedings and that [the Civil Rights Act] is not 'an expressly authorized' exception to [the Anti-Injunction Act]."3 Other opinions

offer all the possible variations that could exist between two
74
such extreme positions.
The legal writings touching on the relationship issue are
76
as divided as the courts. 75 The arguments stated are numerous,
71. In a sampling of some fourteen cases decided on point since 1967,
seven held that § 1983 created no exception; two felt it was a limited exception; five held It to simply be an exception. Those holding it not to be an
exception include: Cole v. Graybeal, 313 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Va. 1970); Eve
Productions, Inc. v. Shannon, 312 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Armstrong v.
Elington, 312 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); Hall v. Crosland, 311 F. Supp.
106 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Ripley v. Stidd, 308 F. Supp. 854 (D. Minn. 1970); 208
Cinema, Inc. v. Vergari, 298 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); Brooks v. Briley,
274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967). Those holding the exception to be limited
in scope include: Gadsden v. Silberglitt, 299 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. N.Y. 1969);
Brock v. Schiro, 264 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1967). Those holding it to be an
exception are: Stewart v. Dameron, 321 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. La. 1971); Duncan
v. Perez, 321 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1970); Strasser v. Doorley, 309 F. Supp.
716 (D. R.I. 1970); Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Miss. 1968);
Hooper v. Gooding, 282 F. Supp. 624 (D. Ariz. 1968).
72. Strasser v. Doorley, 309 F. Supp. 716, 722 (D. R.I. 1970).
73. Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538, 553 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
74. See note 72 supra.
75. Comment, 78 HARV. L. Rzv. 994, 1051 (1964): "The Civil Rights Act
... evinces neither an unambiguous determination to allow stay of state
proceedings nor a purpose to alter the procedural relationship between state
and federal courts. It therefore should not be deemed to constitute an 'express' exception to the anti-injunction statute.
"Certainly the phrase 'suit in equity' does not of itself constitute an
express authorization of injunctions against state court proceedings .... .
Id. at 1050-51. Maraist, FederalInjunctive Relief Against Court Proceedings:
The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TExAs L. REv. 535, 601 (1970): "The doetrine of 'interposition'-the proposition that section 1983 [the Civil Rights
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but the issue really hinges on one central question: If Congress
desired the Civil Rights Act to be an exception to the AntiInjunction Act, why was the Civil Rights Act not more express?
Did Congress desire the Civil Rights Act of 1871, coming at the
end of the Civil War, to be a repudiation of the extreme motions
of federalism exhibited in the Anti-Injunction Act in favor of
greater respect for individual rights? Of course, the answer has
not yet been found. As long as the jurisprudence of the lower
federal courts continues to lack uniformity, only a ruling by the
Supreme Court or, absent that, congressional action, can provide
the solution.
Abstention
Respect for federal-state harmony and a desire to effectuate
smooth functioning of the dual judicial systems in this country
caused the federal courts to adopt a policy of abstaining from
deciding certain cases even where there existed federal jurisdiction. The landmark case on abstention is RailroadCommission
Act] represents an interposition of federal supremacy between a state and
its citizens and thus sanctions injunctive relief when necessary to protect
those citizens--is of questionable merit; one cannot readily accept the
proposition that Congress could have Intended to impose such a sweeping
change in federal-state relations through a weakly worded 1871 statute and
a 1948 Act that sanctioned that interference only when expressly authorized
by statute.
"The most persuasive arguments support the proposition that section
1983 is not an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act." Comment, 1965 DUKE
L. J. 813, 819-20: "It is submitted that the Baines approach [Civil Rights
Act not an exception] is not a proper one .... Several facts lend credence
to an argument that Congress would indeed have approved an injunction in
this section 1983 context ....
"It is reasonable to assume that Congress in 1871 approved interference
with the state courts only under exceptional circumstances and where irreparable injury was imminent." Comment, The Civil Rights Statute As A
Statutory Exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 4 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 55, 72 (1970): "The anti-injunction statute authorizes
a federal court to enjoin a state prosecution where expressly authorized by
an Act of Congress. The conclusion is compelling that section 1983 is such
an act of Congress."
76. The arguments against the Act as an exception include: One, the
Civil Rights Act Is not ambiguous and makes no mention of section 2283.
Two, the Civil Rights Act does not fit Into any of the three exceptions in
section 2283, since it refers to "express" exceptions. Three, Congress could
have made the Civil Rights Act an express exception to section 2283, but has
failed to take advantage of this opportunity.
The arguments that it is an exception include: One, the importance of
the rights governed by section 1983 override any policy of non-intervention.
Two, deference to state sovereignty should not be automatic. Three, the idea
that the Civil Rights Act, coming in 1871, amended pro tanto the AntiInjunction Act, first passed in 1789.
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v. Pullman Co.," wherein Negro porters intervened in an attack
on an order of the Texas Railroad Commission requiring a conductor on all pullman cars. Because all conductors were white,
the porters alleged racial discrimination before a three judge
federal court which enjoined enforcement of the order on
grounds that it was violative of the fourteenth amendment.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court admitted that the charges
of the porters were substantial,78 but sought an alternative to
deciding the case on constitutional grounds. The Court held that
the district court should have abstained from deciding the issue
and remanded the case "with directions to retain the bill pending
a determination of proceedings, to be brought with reasonable
promptness, in the state court .

. . ."9

With this decision, the

Supreme Court ushered into federal-state relations a new doctrine: Where a state interpretation of a statute or a particular
issue could be determinative of a case, then the case should be
remanded to the state court for such a determination."" It should
be noted that in those cases in which the Pullman doctrine of
abstention is applied, the federal courts possess jurisdiction to
decide the case, but hold that jurisdiction in abeyance, pending
the state court determination.8 '
Four years after Pullman, the Supreme Court reiterated its
policy of abstention in American Federation of Labor v. Watson.82 The state of Florida had amended its constitution to pro77. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
78. "The complaint of the Pullman porters undoubtedly tendered a substantial constitutional issue .... It touches a sensitive area of social policy
upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to
its adjudication is open." Id. at 498.
79. Id. at 501-02. "These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal courts, 'exercising a wise discretion,' restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth working of
the federal judiciary."

Id. at 501.

80. It has been recognized by the Supreme Court that mere difficulty in
determining state law, without more, is not sufficient to justify abstention.
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).

81. Abstention has been applied to cases which do not fit into the pattern
of Pullman. Professor Wright has suggested that there are possibly as many
as four separate types of abstention: (1) Pullman; (2) federal court should
abstain where it

is

asked to intervene in

a complicated state regulatory

scheme (see Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); (3) federal court
should abstain in eminent domain cases where the state law is unsettled
(see Louisiana Power & Light v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959)); (4)
federal court may abstain for its own convenience. This paper will be con-

fined, however, to a discussion of the Pullman-type abstention. C.
HANDBOOK

OF THE

LAW

OF FEDERAL

82. 327 U.S. 582 (1946).

COURTS

§ 52 (1970).

WRIGHT,
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hibit "closed-shop" agreements between employers and labor
unions. Several labor unions brought suit before a three judge
district court seeking to restrain law enforcement officials from
carrying out threats to prosecute plaintiffs criminally and bringing civil actions for violation of the amendment. The district
court held that the Florida amendment did not violate the first
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court admitted that the appellants had stated a cause of action in equity (i.e., clear and
imminent danger of irreparable injury) and that they had raised
substantial constitutional issues, but noted that the amendment
had not yet been construed by the Florida courts. Thus, citing
Pullman extensively, the Court applied the abstention doctrine
and directed the district court to retain jurisdiction pending
proceedings in state courts.
However, the Supreme Court does not always abstain in
Pullman-type situations. In Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway Co.,83 the city of Chicago amended its municipal
code to require a motor carrier transporting rail passengers between various stations within the city to obtain a certificate of
convenience and necessity. When a railroad-sponsored transfer
service refused to apply for such a certificate, the city threatened
criminal prosecutions. Thereafter, the railroads applied to federal district court for a declaratory judgment concerning the
validity of the ordinance. The district court dismissed the complaint, but the circuit court reversed, holding the ordinance
violative of the federal constitution. Before the Supreme Court,
the city contended that the federal courts should have abstained
to allow the state courts to give an authoritative ruling on the
scope of the ordinances. Despite the similarity to Pullman, the
Supreme Court refused: "We see no ambiguity in the section
which calls for interpretation by the state courts ....
Remission
to those courts would [only] involve substantial delay and
expense .... ,,84
The Court applied the Pullman doctrine for the first time in
a civil rights case, Harrison v. NAACP,85 but the decision was
hardly unanimous. There, five statutes apparently aimed at impeding the work of the NAACP and the Legal Defense Fund
83. 357 U.S. 77 (1957).
84. Id. at 84.
85. 360 U.S. 167 (1958).
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were enacted by the Virginia legislature. The NAACP sought
both a federal declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of
the statutes and injunctive relief against their enforcement. The
district court declared three of the statutes unconstitutional, but
abstained on the remaining two. The Supreme Court, in a six
to three decision, authored by Justice Harlan, ruled that the
federal court should have abstained on all five statutes until
the Virginia courts had had an opportunity to construe them.
The majority was careful to point out that abstention was a
s6
mere postponement, not an abdication, of federal jurisdiction.
The minority sharply disagreed, contending that civil rights were
not the proper subject for abstention. Five years later, the
minority viewpoint was adopted in Baggett v. Bullitt,87 where
teachers at the University of Washington sought to have the
Loyalty Oath Statute declared unconstitutional and to enjoin its
enforcement on the grounds that it inhibited free speech. A threejudge court applied Pullman and abstained, pending a construction of the statute by the state courts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding abstention to be improper because "[t]he abstention doctrine is not an automatic rule applied whenever a federal
court is faced with a doubtful issue of state law; it rather involves a discretionary exercise of a court's equity powers."88
The Court reasoned that further construction of the state statute
would not render it valid and, further, that the delay caused
by abstention "may inhibit the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms.""9
The elimination of unnecessary interference by federal courts
in state statutory schemes is the avowed purpose of abstention,
but often the practical result of this sought after harmony is
86. "[We are nevertheless of the view that the District Court should
have abstained from deciding the merits of the issues tendered it, so as to
afford the Virginia courts a reasonable opportunity to construe the three
statutes in question ....
This now well-established procedure is aimed at
the avoidance of unnecessary interference by the federal courts with proper
and validly administered state concerns, a course so essential to the balThis principal does not of course,
anced working of our federal system ....
Involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of
its exercise; it serves the policy of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention ....
" Id. at 176-77.
87. 377 U.S. 360 (1964). Although this case did not present a situation of
threatened criminal prosecutions, as the statute did not contain any penal
provisions, the teachers were threatened with loss of their employment if
they failed to comply. The case is important in showing the Court's attitude toward abstention in cases involving civil rights, and particularly first
amendment rights.
88. Id. at 375.
89. Id. at 379.
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lengthy and complex litigation, as exemplified in England v.
Board of Medical Examiners.0 In that case, plaintiff chiropracters had sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the federal
district court claiming the educational requirement of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act prevented them from practicing, thus
violating their rights under the fourteenth amendment. The district court, applying Pullman, abstained on the ground that the
state court might find that the statute did not apply to the plaintiffs.91 At the state hearing, the plaintiffs not only argued that the
statute did not apply to them, but also argued that the statute
was unconstitutional. When the state court rejected that contention, the plaintiffs attempted to return that issue to the federal
district court. However, the federal court refused to hear the case
on the ground that the federal issue had been adequately determined by the state court. Although an earlier case seemed to hold
to the contrary, 2 the Supreme Court held, on appeal, "that if a
party freely and without reservation submits his federal claims
for decision by the state courts, litigates them there, and has
them decided there, then ... he has elected to forego his right to
return to the District Court."9 8 The Court then enunciated a complex procedure to be followed in such a situation.9 4 In a lengthy
dissent, Justice Douglas suggested that the instant opinion made
the Pullman doctrine unworkable and expressed second thoughts
on the usefulness of the whole theory.9 5
90. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
91. England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 180 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. La.
1960). Although the district court realized abstention might cause delay and
expense, this was not necessarily a consideration In staying its hand:
"Where comity moves the federal courts to abstain, the cost in time and
money Is said to be justified by the resulting federal accommodation." Id.
at 124.
92. In NAACP v. Button, 871 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court had held that
after a state court had given an authoritative ruling In an abstention case
a party could return to the district court for a final determination.
93. England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964).
94. "[The petitioner] may accomplish this by making on the state record
the 'reservation to the disposition of the entire case by the state courts'
that we referred to In Button. That Is, he may Inform the state courts
that he Is exposing his federal claims there only for the purpose of complying with WinlIor [Government Employees v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364
(1957)], and that he intends, should the state courts hold against him on
the question of state law, to return to the District Court for disposition
of his federal claims." Id. at 421.
95. "I was a member of the Court that launched Pulnman and set It
on its way. But If I had realized the creature it was to become, my doubts
would have been far deeper than they were ....
Referral to state courts for
declaratory rulings on state law questions Is said to encourage a smooth
operation of our federalism, as it may avoid clashes between the two systems. But there always have been clashes, and always will be and the
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The Pullman case was the first to announce the doctrine of
abstention. By abstaining, the Court was able to avoid the sensitive issue of equal protection raised by the Negro porters. By
1965 the doctrine had undergone radical change however, and the
cases indicated that no longer were civil rights a proper subject
for abstention and further, that the delay caused by abstention
would be harmful in first amendment cases.
The Declaratory Judgment
Often, one seeking a federal injunction against state criminal
prosecution will contemporaneously pray to have that statute
declared unconstitutional by the federal court. Unlike the history of injunctions, the history of declaratory judgments in the
United States is brief, for it is a virtual newcomer to the federal
courts. Prior to 1934 the Supreme Court refused to recognize the
declaratory judgment, fearing that it was an advisory opinion.
However, in that year Congress enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act.9 6 The Act does not authorize advisory opinions, but
rather allows the court to grant the petitioner relief through
declaration at an earlier stage in the dispute than was possible
before the passage of the Act. At this point in the controversy the
parties may not have reached the stage where they can seek a
coercive remedy, yet they can still present their claims to a
97
federal court for a declaration as to their rights.
The requirements of a declaratory judgment are no less
strict than in any other suit in federal court: There must exist
a case or controversy between persons having adverse legal interests.98 However the question of what constitutes a case or
influence of the Pullman doctrine has, I think, been de minimis." "What
we do today makes the Pullman case something of a Frankenstein." Id. at
425-26, 429, respectively.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970) states: "In a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction, except with respect to federal taxes, any court of
the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare
the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree
and be reviewable as such."
97. "The purpose of actions for declaratory judgment Is to provide a
means by which rights and obligations may be adjudicated in cases involving an actual controversy that has not reached the stage at which either
party may seek a coercive remedy ... " 3 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICe AND PROCEDURI § 1262, at 274 (Wright ed. 1958).
98. "As Is well known, the federal courts established pursuant to Article
III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions. For adjudication
of constitutional issues, 'concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases,
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controversy may cause difficulty. In Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Pacific Coal & Oil Co.,99 the Supreme Court said:
"The difference between an abstract question and a 'controversy' contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is
necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it
would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining
in every case whether there is such a controversy. Basically,
the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under
all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of
a declaratory judgment."'' '
Can a case or controversy be found in the "chilling effect"
caused by vague or overbroad statutes regulating first amendment freedoms?o1l One federal district court has answered in the
affirmative, 0 2 but this case seems out of line with the Supreme
Court case of Golden v. Zwickler0l
rendered a year earlier.
There the Court held that once the specific issues in a suit for a
declaratory judgment had become moot, the more general question of the statute's constitutionality in terms of its effects on
freedom of speech did not present a sufficient case or controversy
to warrant hearing the case. Perhaps the aversion of federal
courts to render advisory opinions absent a live case or controversy, plus respect for federal-state relations (comity), have
caused federal courts to examine closely any request for a
not abstractions,' are requisite. This is as true of declaratory judgments
as any other field." United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1946).
A declaratory judgment applies only to cases or controversies within the
constitutional sense. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937);
Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952).

99. 312 U.S. 270 (1941).
100. Id.

at 273.

101. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court
spoke in terms of the "chilling effect" caused by vague or overbroad
statutes regulating freedom of expression. For further discussion of this
point, see text accompanying note 117 infra.
102. "It is well recognized that the 'chilling' effect of state prosecutions upon the exercise of free speech may provide an 'actual controversy'
even after the state prosecutions have been dismissed or otherwise become
moot." Decker v. Fillis, 306 F.

Supp. 613, 616 (D. Utah 1969).

103. 394 U.S. 103 (1969). "[I]t appears that
form of a chilling effect may be more readily
suits not so affected with a First Amendment
number of reasons we are not persuaded that

suits alleging injury in the
justiciable than comparable
interest. Nonetheless, for a
every plaintiff who alleges

a First Amendment chilling effect and shivers in court has thereby established a case or controversy." National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d

1103, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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declaratory judgment. 10 4 In fact, the courts are under no mandate
to give a declaration. As early as 1941, the Supreme Court held
that a district court need not make use of the jurisdiction it
acquired through the Declaratory Judgment Act; 10 5 the power to
apply that remedy is discretionary 06 1
Unlike the injunction, the request for a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of a state statute need not be heard
by a special three-judge federal court.""' The Supreme Court has
held that there is no reason to use the safeguard of a three-judge
court because a declaratory judgment does not "paralyze" any
state or federal scheme. 0 8 This is also significant in terms of
review, because there is no right to a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court unless the constitutionality of the statute is
decided by a three-judge federal panel. This lack of the right to a
direct appeal in declaratory judgment cases has been explicitly
recognized in several Supreme Court decisions. 0 9 The fact that
104. See note 98 supra.
105. "Although the district court had jurisdiction of the suit under the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, it was under no compulsion to exercise
that jurisdiction." Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942).
106. "The Declaratory Judgment Act was an authorization, not a command. It gave the federal courts competence to make a declaration of
rights; it did not impose a duty to do so." Public Affairs Press v. Rickover,
369 U.S. 111, 113 (1962); and "The extent to which the declaratory judgment
procedure may be used in the federal courts to control state action lies
In the sound discretion of the court." Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325
U.S. 450, 471 (1945).
107. "An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action
of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such
statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission
acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or
judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute
unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court
of three judges under section 2884 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
108. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
109. In Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1969), there was a request
to declare the Minnesota Communist Control Act unconstitutional. A threejudge district court, which earlier had issued an injunction to allow the
names of Communist candidates to appear on the election ballot, refused
the declaratory judgments saying it was not certain enough that Communists would attempt to run in the future. The Communists sought direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the injunction
issue of the first decision was moot and, since the second decision was
only on the request for declaratory relief, no direct appeal would be
allowed, even though the decision in that case was in fact rendered by a
three-judge court. See [also] Gunn v. University Comm., 399 U.S. 383 (1970);
Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820 (1970).
"Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the
Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing,
an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a
district court of three judges." 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). (Emphasis added.)

1972]

COMMENTS

the Three Judge Court Act and the Direct Appeal Statute apply
to injunctions, but not to declaratory judgments, illustrates an
important difference in the two remedies. Congress enacted the
Declaratory Judgment Act to provide a milder alternative to
injunctions, and to a large extent Congress has achieved its
purpose.
As previously mentioned, one seeking relief, particularly
from state criminal prosecution, will often ask for both declaratory and injunctive relief. This dual request necessitates the use
of a three-judge panel and presents the prohibition of the AntiInjunction Act when state proceedings are pending. However, it
is theoretically possible for a party to completely circumvent
the bar of the Anti-Injunction Act by first seeking only a declaratory judgment. If the federal court declares the state statute
unconstitutional, the petitioner may then seek injunctive relief
from the pending proceedings. Then the exception of the AntiInjunction Act which allows a federal injunction against pending
proceedings to "effectuate [the federal court's] judgment" would
be applicable.11 This procedure was followed in Landry v.
Daley,"' wherein two disorderly conduct statutes had been
declared unconstitutional in an earlier ruling by the federal
court. The court then made ad hoc examinations of prosecutions
pending under the statutes, issuing injunctions where it deemed
appropriate. The court held that:
"The federal anti-injunction statute ... does not bar the
use of our injunctive power in the instant situation. We have
already entered a judgment declaring the ordinances in
question unconstitutional as overly broad and too vague to
meet due process requirements.... Consequently, we find an
injunction necessary to effectuate our judgment of unconstitutionality of the ordinances. An injunction necessary to
'protect or effectuate' the judgment of a federal court is a
stated exception to the prohibition of section 2283 [the Anti-

Injunction Act] ."112
Such use of the declaratory judgment illustrates the power of
the remedy, a far cry from the "mild" remedy envisaged by
Congress.
110. Maraist, Federal Injunctive ReZef Against State Court Proceedings:
The Signiftcance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 535, 596 (1970).
111. 288 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. I1. 1968).
112. Id. at 194.
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Finally, the impact of Zwickler v. Koota 1 3 upon the availability of federal relief against state prosecution must be considered. In that case the Supreme Court, in response to a request
for declaratory and injunctive relief from a New York law forbidding the distribution of anonymous handbills, held that a
district court should consider the two requests independently
when deciding whether to hear the issues or abstain. 114 Although
this holding has not been unanimously applied in the lower
federal courts," 5 it has gained a wide following in the majority
of those courts in cases of both pending and threatened state
criminal prosecutions.""
Dombrowski and Its Progeny
Civil rights, federal equitable relief, and comity came together in Dombrowski v. Pfister,17 which was called, by some, a
113. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
114. "For a request for a declaratory judgment that a state statute is
overbroad on its face must be considered independently of any request for
injunctive relief against the enforcement of that statute. We hold that a
federal district court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the
merits of the declaratory request, irrespective of its conclusion as to the
propriety of the issuance of the injunction." Id. at 254.
115. In McLucas v. Palmer, 427 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1970), the court
said: "A declaratory judgment would create the same opportunity as an
injunction for delay and disruption of the state criminal proceeding and
the same danger of having federal courts plunge themselves into the consideration of Issues that may prove academic or at least may appear in a
different light after trial.
"rT]he denial of federal relief rests on the desire to avoid unnecessary
friction between state and federal courts and piecemeal litigation of criminal
cases. Declaratory judgments can be as dangerous as injunctions in that
respect." Engelman v. Cahn, 425 F.2d 954, 959, n.3 (2d Cir. 1969).
116. "We follow Zwickler in holding that the district court has the duty
to decide the appropriateness and merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction."
Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299, 1309 (5th Cir. 1970).
"However, Brown also seeks declaratory relief that the Oklahoma
statute is Invalid and this calls for a separate assessment as is required
by . . . Zwickler.
Brown v. Fallis, 311 F. Supp. 548, 551 (N.D. Okla.
1970).
"Clearly, the question whether to abstain concerning an injunction
against the enforcement of state criminal laws is divorced from concerns
of abstention in rendering a declaratory judgment." Roe v. Wade, 314 F.
Supp. 1217, 1224 (N.D. Texas 1970).
"Where in fact, basic constitutional questions are sought to be adjudicated, and the existence of the statute or the continued application
thereof . . . will have a substantial chilling effect upon the plaintiff's
exercise of the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, the Court must
consider a request for declaratory judgment even apart from injunctive
relief." Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62, 72 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
See also Burton v. City of St. Louis, 309 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Mo. 1970);
Milky Way Prod., Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); Delta
Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969).
117. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).

1972]

COMMENTS

landmark case. Appellants were members of the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF), a civil rights organization
engaged in work in Louisiana. Claiming that the Louisiana
Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and the Communist Propaganda Control Law were overboard, and thus void
on their face as violative of the first amendment freedom of expression, appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act 1 8 from a three-judge federal court. They
further alleged bad faith on the part of local law enforcement
officials, claiming that threats to enforce various sections of the
statutes were made purely to harass them, without any hope of
securing valid convictions. 119
The federal district court refused to decide the case, however, finding that the issues did not present a situation of
threatened irreparable injury and that a possible narrow construction of the applicable sections of the statutes by the state
courts would avoid the necessity of deciding the constitutional
issue. 120
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, first noting
that, due to a successful motion to quash, no state proceedings
were actually pending at the time relief was sought from the
federal courts. Thus, the Anti-Injunction Act was inapplicable. 121
The Court then noted the general principle that a federal court
will not interfere with a state's good faith administration of its
criminal laws, but failed to apply the principle because special
circumstances were said to exist in the instant case. The delay
necessary to allow appellants to return to the state courts would
have had an adverse effect on the very first amendment rights
appellents were seeking to protect.122 Furthermore, the Court
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
119. In

Dombrowski the Louisiana police had raided appellants' offices,

seized their files, and arrested them. However, a state court quashed the
arrest and ordered the illegally seized evidence returned. But, prosecution
was continually threatened and after suit was filed in the federal district
court, the Orleans Parish Grand Jury returned indictments against appellants, under several sections of the aforementioned statutes.
120. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964).
121. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
122. "But the allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which
defense of the State's criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression will occur if appellants must await
the state court's disposition and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse
determination. These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable injury."
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
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decided that cases dealing with statutes limiting freedom of
expression were of a special nature:
"The assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will
generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is
unfounded in such cases. .

.

. The chilling effect upon the

exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the
fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its
success or failure."'21
The Court disagreed with the district court over the propriety of abstention: "We hold the abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases such as the present one where ...statutes are
justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression,
or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities."'2 4 The Court reasoned that since there were continuing
threats to enforce additional provisions of the statutes, the violations of which were not charged in the indictments, a single
state criminal proceeding on the indictments would not resolve
all the constitutional questions springing from the statute. The
Court considered piecemeal litigation on each section to be an
unacceptable method of resolving constitutional issues raised by
the overbroad statute.
The Court further found the necessary prerequisites for
traditional equitable relief to be present in Dombrowski. The
allegations of appellants tended to show bad faith enforcement
of the statutes, if not harassment. Further, there was the vagueness and overbreadth of the statutes themselves: "We have
already seen that where, as here, prosecutions are actually
threatened, this challenge [vagueness and overbreadth], if not
clearly frivolous, will establish the threat of irreparable injury
was directed
required by ...equity.' 125 Hence, the dictrict court
26

to enjoin all state prosecutions under the statute.
123. Id. at 486-87.

124. Id. at 489-90. The Court further stated: "[A]bstention serves no
legitimate purpose where a statute regulating speech is properly attacked
on its face, and where, as here, the conduct charged in the indictments
is not within the reach of an acceptable limiting construction readily to be
anticipated as the result of a single criminal prosecution and is not the
sort of 'hardcore' conduct that would obviously be prohibited under any
construction." Id. at 491-92.
125. Id. at 490.
126. The Court recognized the right of the district court to modify the
injunction to permit prosecutions if the state, in a non-criminal action,
sulfciently narrowed the statutes.
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Justice Harlan, dissenting, expressed concern over federalstate relations in the aftermath of Dombrowski. He felt the case
stood for the proposition that abstention was not to be applied
in any suit wherein criminal statutes were attacked for vagueness on claims based on the first and fourteenth amendments. 12'
But was Dombrowski really a landmark case? The idea that
a court of equity would not interfere in state criminal prosecutions had already fallen into partial disfavor before Dombrowski.12 Throughout the immediately preceding decades, the idea
had developed that civil rights presented special cases for the
application of equitable relief. It had previously been stated that
the mere delay required by abstention was sufficient to "chill"
the very rights for which protection had been sought. 1 29 Furthermore, the necessity of good faith prosecution of criminal laws
had often been mentioned in federal courts of equity.1 0 In only
one area was Dombrowski clearly important: The case indicated
that where there was the mere threat of prosecution on an overbroad statute regulating freedom of expression, and a single
prosecution would not be sufficient to resolve the constitutional
issues, then federal equitable relief would be appropriate.' 1' In
addition, if the statute regulating free speech were not overbroad, but was applied in bad faith for the purpose of "discouraging protected activities," federal intervention would again be
applicable.13 2 Indeed, were this the holding, Dombrowski would
have signified a considerable easing in the requisites of irreparable injury and a corresponding greater chance for securing
federal equitable relief. In fact, some lower federal courts have
interpreted Dombrowski to mean that mere vagueness or overbreadth of a statute regulating the freedom of expression plus
the threat of prosecution, without the presence of bad faith, could
justify intervention.1 3"
127. Id. at 498-502.
128. See text accompanying notes 16 and 17 supra.
129. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
130. Douglas v. Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S.
387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri P. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1940).
131. See note 123 supra.
132. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
133. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968). See PBIC,
Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass. 1970) (either facially Invalid
statute or bad faith of the prosecution, without the other, may be sufficient
to justify federal intervention to enjoin state prosecution); Original Fayette
County Civil & Welfare League, Inc. v. Ellington, 309 F. Supp. (W.D. Tenn.
1970) (special circumstances requiring an injunction may be present even
absent bad faith enforcement If first amendment rights are at stake); Lan-
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The cases decided by the Supreme Court after Dombrowski
did nothing to clarify whether a threatened prosecution under
an invalid statute was sufficient for an injunction. However, it
is interesting to note how the Court applied Dombrowski to those
cases dealing with federal court intervention in state proceedings.
In 'Cameron v. Johnson,131 4 the Court said: "Dombrowski recognized ..

.

the continuing validity of the maxim that a federal

district court should be slow to act 'where its powers are invoked
to interfere by injunction with threatened criminal prosecutions in a state court . . ...
"5

and interpreted Dombrowski as

being consistent with other decisions in its area.
In Zwickler v. Koota,86 in language similar to that used in
Dombrowski, Justice Brennan spoke for the majority:
"These principles [that absention is not proper] have
particular significance when, as in this case, the attack upon
the statute on its face is for repugnancy to the First Amendment. In such a case to force the plaintiff to ... suffer the

delay of state court proceedings might itself effect the impermissible ' chilling of the very constitutional right he seeks to
protect. ,"T

The Court then held that the merits of a declaratory judgment
request should be considered independently of a request for
injunction where the two remedies are sought in the same petition. The Court felt that this result was an outgrowth of Dambrowski and its treatment of the doctrine of abstention:
"Dombrowski teaches [us] that the questions of abstention
and of injunction are not the same.
dry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Ill.
1968) (state court prosecution based
on vague and overly broad provisions of statute may itself be violative of
due process and warrant federal injunction against prosecution).
134. 390 U.S. 611 (1968). This case had first come to the Court in 1965
(381 U.S. 741 (1965)). There, pickets brought an action to enjoin prosecutions under a Mississippi Anti-Picketing Statute, claiming, inter alia, that
it violated their rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The Court
remanded the case after the Dombrowski decision with Instructions to the
district court to decide if the Civil Rights Act constituted an exception
to the Anti-Injunction statute. The district court held that the Act did not
constitute an exception. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's ruling because the challenged state statute was not overly broad
nor was there bad faith prosecution, thereby ignoring the question of
the relationship between the Civil Rights Act and the Anti-Injunction Act.
135. Id. at 618.
136. 389 U.S. 241 (1967). See text accompanying note 113 supra.
137. Id. at 252.
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"It follows that . . . a request for a declaratory judgment that a state statute is overbroad on its face must be
considered independently of any request for injunctive relief
against enforcement of that statute."'"1
Another case in which appellants sought to take advantage
of Dombrowski was Zwicker v. Boll.'
There, students arrested
in a demonstration were charged with disorderly conduct. They
unsuccessfully sought both declaratory and injunctive relief
from a three-judge court. The district court held:
"Dombrowski requires a federal court to enjoin threatened state prosecution when there is reason to believe that
the state's action will have a 'chilling effect' upon a citizen's
exercise of his rights under the first and fourteenth amendments."'4
In holding that it was necessary to show both a bad faith
prosecution and an invalid statute to prove a chilling affect,
the three-judge court seemed to be interpreting Dombrowski as
merely an application of the traditional requirements for the
applicability of federal injunctive relief. The Supreme Court
affirmed the denial of relief without comment.14'
Dombrowski, then, had left the area of federal injunctive
relief from state court prosecutions unsettled. It had stated the
rule that the mere threat of prosecution coupled with an invalid
statute regulating first amendment freedoms might be sufficient
to warrant an injunction, but it was unclear whether the Supreme Court would apply the rule to cases presenting similar
situations.
Younger and Samuels
The question of whether the invalidity of a statute affecting
freedom of expression, without more, could justify federal injunctive relief was finally treated in two recent Supreme Court
42
cases: Younger v. Harris1
and Samuels v. Mackell. 4s In Young138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 254.
391 U.S. 353 (1968).
Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131, 135 (W.D. Wis. 1967).
Zwicker v. Boll, 391 U.S. 353 (1968).

142. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

143. 401 U.S. 66 (1971). The Court also rendered five related decisions
on the same day: Fernandez v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry,
401 U.S. 77 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein,

401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
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er, appellee Harris had been indicted for violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act.1 4 Harris brought suit in federal district court under the Civil Rights Act, section 1983, to
enjoin any prosecution against him, claiming that the state act
inhibited his exercise of first and fourteenth amendment rights.
The district court declared the act void due to vagueness and
overbreadth, and enjoined any further prosecution against Harris. In granting an appeal to the state's prosecutor, the Supreme
Court asked him to argue, inter alia, that the injunction violated
the Anti-Injunction Act. The effect of this argument is not reported, however, because the Court did not base its reversal on
that statute. Rather, the Court noted the federal policy of refusing to intervene in state criminal proceedings except under
special circumstances and sketched a brief outline of the decisions prior to Dombrowski which held that irreparable harm
was a requisite to injunctive relief.14 5 However, the major preDombrowski decisions cited by the Court'" dealt with threatened
144. CALIF. P*ENAL CODE §§ 11400-11401 (Deering 1959): "§ 11400: 'Criminal

syndicalism' as used in this article means any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage
(which word is hereby defined as meaning wilful and malicious physical
damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force and
violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political
change."
"§ 11401. Unlawful acts: Penalty.
"Any person who:
"1. By spoken or written words or personal conduct advocates, teaches
or aids and abets criminal syndicalism or the duty, necessity or propriety
of committing crime, sabotage, violence or any unlawful method of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or
control, or effecting any political change; or
"2. Wilfully and deliberately by spoken or written words justifies or
attempts to justify criminal syndicalism or the commission or attempt to
commit crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism with
intent to approve, advocate or further the doctrine of criminal syndicalism; or
"3. Prints, publishes, edits, issues or circulates or publicly displays any
book, paper, pamphlet, document, poster or written or printed matter in
any other form, containing or carrying written or printed advocacy, teaching, or aid and abetment of, or advising, criminal syndicalism; or
"4. Organizes or assists in organizing or is or knowingly becomes a
member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons
organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism; or
"5. Wilfully by personal act or conduct, practices or commits any act
advised, advocated, taught or aided and abetted by the doctrine or precept
of criminal syndicalism,. vith intent to accomplish a change in industrial
ownership or control, or effecting any political change;
"Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
not less than bne nor more than 14 years."
145. 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
146. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Fenner v. Boykin,
271 U.S. 240 (1926); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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prosecutions while Younger involved a pending prosecution, an
important difference. 14
The Court based its holding on the failure of appellee to
meet the traditional requirements for an injunction by not
establishing a case of irreparable harm, rather than on the prohibition contained in the Anti-Injunction Act. In this way, the
Court attempted to clairfy the Dombrowski decision. Noting
that Dombrowski had been erroneously interpreted by some
courts to mean that a bad faith prosecution need not be present
to obtain injunctive relief,1'8 the Court recognized that such a
misunderstanding was not wholly unjustified,149 but held it was
not a correct statement of the holding because both bad faith
prosecution and an invalid statute were present in DombrowAlthough Dombrokski did present both harassment and
ski.'
an overbroad statute, it is not as clear as the Court would have
it seem that the holding of Dombrowski was not stated in the
alternative-bad faith or an invalid statute which "chilled" the
first amendment rights.15' The Court denied injunctive relief,
finding that the appellee had not shown harassment; hence, the,
prerequisite of irreparable injury had not been satisfied.
In another case decided the same day as Younger, the Court
rendered an opinion concerning the propriety of a declaratory
judgment once a requested injunction had been denied. In
Samuels v. Mackel,152 appellants were charged with violating
two New York criminal anarchy statutes. They alleged that
the statutes were "[v]oid for vagueness in violation of due process, and an abridgment of free speech, press, and assembly in
147. Younger .v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). At the very beginning
of the opinion the Court made it clear that it was dealing solely with
pending prosecutions: "We express no view about the circumstances under
which federal courts may act when there Is no prosecution pending in state
courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun."
148. Id. at 50: "The District Court [in Younger], however, thought that
the Dombrowski decision substantially broadened the availability of Injunctions against state criminal prosecutions and that under that decision the
federal courts may give equitable relief, without regard to any showing
of bad faith or harassment, whenever a state statute is found 'on its face'
to be vague or overly broad, in violation of the First Amendment."
149. Id.: "We recognize that there are some statements in the Dombrowski opinion that would seem to support this argument."
150. Id.: "But as we have already seen, such statements were unnecessary to the decision of that case, because the Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged a basis for equitable relief under the long-established'
standards."
151. See note 133 supra.
152. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
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violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments ...."15 and,
thus, any prosecution under the statutes would harass appellants
and cause them irreparable damage. Appellants petitioned for
injunctive relief and, in the alternative, for a declaratory judgment, but only the declaration was granted. Referring to Younger, the Court held that appellants had failed to establish the
possibility of irreparable damage necessary for injunctive relief
4
and that the request for declaratory relief should be denied.'
In refusing declaratory relief, the Court reasoned that the Declaratory Judgment Act required declaratory judgments to be
tested by the standards of traditional equitable relief. Hence,
if no irreparable harm were shown, no declaratory relief could
be granted. Thus, the standards for a declaratory judgment
were as rigid as those for an injunction. 1'5
In so ruling the Court made no mention of the holding of
Zwickler v. Koota'11 that considerations for injunctive and declaratory relief should be judged independently. Perhaps because
Samuels purported to deal only with pending prosecutions,'5 7 the
Court felt no need to mention a case dealing with threatened
prosecution. However, the distinction between pending prosecutions and threatened prosecutions as justification for neglecting
Koota is weakened by the fact that the Court uses the two situations almost interchangeably in Younger, Dyson v. Stein,158and
PerezA v. Ledesma.159 Further, it does not necessarily follow from
the difference between pending and threatened prosecutions that
a different result should be reached in regard to requirements
for declaratory relief as opposed to injunctive relief. Although
intervention may cause interference with state officials in either
153. Id. at 67.
154. "[O]ur decision in the Younger case is dispositive of the prayers
for injunctions here. . . . [W]e hold that [the] alternative prayer [for
declaratory judgment] does not require a different result . . . ." Id.

at 68.

155. "[T]he same equitable principles relevant to the propriety of an
injunction must be taken into consideration by federal district courts in
determining whether to issue a declaratory judgment, and that where an
injunction would be impermissible under these principles, declaratory relief
should ordinarily be denied as well." Id. at 73. But FED.R. Civ. P. 57 shows

that traditional equitable standards do not strictly govern a request for
declaratory relief: "The existence of another adequate remedy does not
preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate."
156. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
157. "[W]here the criminal proceeding was begun prior to the federal
civil suit, the propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief should be judged

by essentially the same standards." Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971).
(Emphasis added.)
158. 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
159. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).

1972]

COMMENTS

case, surely a declaratory judgment will cause no more disturbance in relation to an injunction in a pending prosecution than
it would cause in relation to an injunction in a threatened prosecution. The Court implies that in a threatened prosecution, considerations for a declaratory judgment should be distinct from
those governing an injunction, while in a pending prosecution,
the considerations should be the same. In support of the Court's
decision, it may be said simply that any interference with pending state proceedings must be approached more delicately than
those with threatened state proceedings. However, this policy
justification does not explain why the Court decided, four years
after Koota, that a declaratory judgment is as disruptive as an
injunction, a decision which effectively repudiated Koota.
Conclusion
What is the state of Dombrowski as interpreted by the
Younger court? It was noted that Younger treated the request
for injunctive relief by reference to cases of threatened and
not pending prosecutions. Traditionally, the two situations have
been distinguished because it was felt that more friction was
created by federal interference in pending prosecutions. Indeed,
the distinction is pivotal in dealing with the Anti-Injunction
Act. However, the Younger court, in using cases of threatened
and pending prosecution almost interchangeably, impliedly made
an important statement on the doctrine of traditional equitable
relief: That relief depends on the presence of irreparable harm,
unaffected by the fact that state proceedings may be pending or
threatened. The pending-threatened distinction is a product of
an entirely different concept, that of comity. Though it can be
said that Younger does not affect Dombrowski because the former speaks only to cases of pending prosecution, with the realization that irreparable harm does not depend on that distinction
and, further, the Younger court's statement that an overbroad
statute, absent harassment, does not constitute irreparable harm,
it is submitted that Dombrowski has been effectively limited. By
approaching the problem in terms of failure to meet the standards of traditional equitable relief, the Court did not find it
necessary to comment on comity and abstention. Since the
Court appears to de-emphasize the special nature of statutes
regulating first amendment freedoms, it would seem that the
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premise that civil rights are not a proper area for abstention
may soon be re-evaluated.
Other problems remain unsettled in this area. The Court has
yet to authoritatively rule on whether the Civil Rights Act (section 1983) is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute. Because Harris raised this issue in Younger, the Court had the
opportunity to decide it, but apparently the Court chose to avoid
this issue in order to clarify Dombrowski. There is finally the
problem of Samuels-does it overrule Koota so that considerations for rendering a declaratory judgment are now the same as
those for ordering an injunction in threatened as well as pending
prosecutions? The answers to these questions await clarification
by the Supreme Court.
S. Gene Fendler
STANDING AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIESEXPANDING CONCEPTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Administrative agencies are a relatively recent innovation,
and their exact function in the governmental process is still being
defined. At the same time, they continue to increase in both
number and authority. On the federal level, recent laws such as
the Wilderness Act' and the National Environmental Policy Act 2
have added a new dimension of responsibilities to the agencies'
concerns.
In the wake of these new laws has come the question of what
parties may invoke the aid of the courts in order to compel
adherence to these new enactments. Thus, the recurring problem
of standing to invoke judicial review of administrative actions
has arisen once more in a dramatically different context. Old
notions of legal and economic injuries appear incapable of solving aesthetic and environmental problems. Yet, old notions
sometimes die slowly. While some courts have perceived that
new weapons must be fashioned if these public rights are to be
upheld, others cling tenaciously to traditional concepts in dealing
with this "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction." It is
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1134 (1970).

2. Id. §§ 4321-4347.
3. United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S.
153, 156 (1953). In this case, the Secretary of the Interior and a cooperative
electrical association sought to set aside a license granted to a private util-

